Bid Depository Operation: An Invitation to Boycott? by Editors,
COMMENT
BID DEPOSITORY OPERATION: AN INVITATION
TO BOYCOTT?
In the recent case of Christiansen v. Mechanical Contractors Bid
Depository' defendant was a bid depository through which its members,
a majority of the mechanical contractors in Utah, could submit subbids on
building projects to general contractors. 2  Upon request from a general
contractor, the depository collected sealed subbids from its members and
delivered them to the general contractor who was required to agree to use
only the bids thus received in the preparation of his prime bid.3 The
agreement was rigidly enforced, and violation could result in being denied
further use of the depository; the names of general contractors who violated
the agreement were sent to depository members. Plaintiff, a mechanical
contractor who was not a member of the depository, brought suit against
the depository 4 alleging that the required agreement, inter alia, violated
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.5 The court found that plaintiff "was
substantially excluded from the opportunity of competing in the business
bid through the Depository" 6 and held that three depository rules, "repre-
senting as they do an agreement of the Depository with its members and
1230 F. Supp. 186 (D. Utah 1964).
2 A general contractor usually enters into a single comprehensive contract in
which he assumes responsibility for an entire construction project. He then sub-
contracts with mechanical contractors for specialized portions of the work. Therefore,
in preparing a prime bid, a general contractor usually solicits subbids on the specialized
work in order to estimate his costs accurately. Obtaining the most favorable subbids
vill, of course, enable the general contractor to submit the lowest prime bid.
3 Depository rule V provided that: "It is to be explicitly understood that the
depository will forward bids to general contractors making request therefor [sic]
with the understanding that the general contractor will use only bids thus received
from the depository in preparing his bid." 230 F. Supp. at 188.
It seems natural to assume that, in the event a general contractor were awarded
the prime contract, he would be required to accept the subbid used in preparing the
prime bid although this conclusion is not stated in the regulations.
4This was a private suit filed under the Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
5 § 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . .
is declared to be illegal . ...
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States . ..shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor . . ..
26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964).
6 230 F. Supp. at 194.
(231)
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the general contractors requesting Depository bids . . . constitute a con-
spiratorial contract and combination in restraint of interstate commerce." 7
While unilateral refusal to deal is recognized as a general right under
the Sherman Act,8 a group boycott, or concerted refusal to deal, is illegal
per se under section 1.9 Group boycotts, typically involving a purpose to
remove third parties from competition 'D or to force their compliance with
a pattern of conduct desired by the group 11 are viewed as being so dan-
gerous to competition that "inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use" is irrelevant. 2 Closely
analogous to boycotts are agreements in which one of the participating
parties agrees to deal exclusively with the other as a condition of doing
business.' 3 Such agreements, generally involving legitimate business pur-
poses,' 4 are illegal only if their practical effect is to foreclose nonparticipat-
ing parties from "a substantial share of the line of commerce affected." 16
7 Id. at 189. The court also held that the rules constituted an attempt to monopo-
lize in violation of § 2 but articulated no basis for so holding. Courts generally seem
to reason that when an unreasonable restraint is found under § 1, a § 2 violation can
be presumed, and defendants have the burden of clearing themselves of the predatory
intent necessary for violation. See United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148
F. Supp. 915, 920 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 22 (1957).
8United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); see Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953). The right, however, is
not absolute. An individual refusal to deal, if accompanied by other restrictive prac-
tices or agreements, see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) ;
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), or conceived of with a monopo-
listic purpose, see Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), is illegal
under the act.
9 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961)
(per curiam) ; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) ; Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941); Handler,
Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-59, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 843, 862-66
(1959).
10 See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., supra note 9;
Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, stpra note 9; Barber, Refusals To Deal Under
the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Ray. 847, 875-76 (1955).
" See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941);
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
12 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ; see Kirkpatrick,
Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 GEo. WASH. L.
Rav. 387, 392 (1942).
13 See generally REPoRT OF ATT'y GEN. NAT'L CoMm. ANTITRUST 137-49 (1955).
14 See id. at 145; ScnwARTz, Faa_ ENT RPRISE AND EcoNoMIc ORGANIZATION
482 (2d ed. 1959).
15 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); see Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 325-29 (1961). Illegality is generally
tested under § 3 of the Clayton Act, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to . . . make
a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . on the condition, agreement, or under-
standing that the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods
of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where the effect of
such . . . sale, or contract for sale . . . may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964). However, not all exclusive dealing
arrangements fall within the specific terms of the act, and illegality may be tested
under the broader terms of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609-10 (1953) ; United States v. Investors Diversi-
fied Servs., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951).
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Thus in exclusive dealing arrangements, the per se doctrine of group
boycotts is not applicable and it is necessary to determine the precise
effect of the agreement.
The procedure by which general contractors secure cost estimates and
negotiate subcontracts on portions of a building project to be performed
by subcontractors has been the subject of considerable controversy.16
Basically, the general contractor is free to solicit secret competitive sub-
bids or to bargain for subcontractors' services on the open market, and
there is no evidence of any compelling economic reason to limit his freedom
to use either method or both.17 Subcontractors, however, urge that
such freedom often leads to "unfair" negotiating tactics on the part of
general contractors 18 and thus have expressed a preference for limiting the
16 Since 1932 federal legislation has been proposed to exercise a degree of control
over this procedure by requiring general contractors to name the subcontractors they
intend to engage when submitting prime bids on government projects. Schueller,
Bid Depositories, 58 MIcH. L. Rxv. 497, 503-06 (1960).
Although their methods differ, a few states have enacted legislation to control
the procedure. One approach is similar to that proposed for federal legislation. Aim.
STAT. ANN. § 14-613 (Supp. 1963); CAL. GOVT CODE § 4104. Another approach is
the so-called separate contract system in which subcontractors submit their subbids
directly to the awarding authorities and are awarded separate subcontracts. N.Y.
STATE FIN. LAW § 135; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-128 (1964); OHIo REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 153.51 (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 53, § 1003 (1957). Massachusetts uses a
complex preselection system for receiving separate subbids. The subbids are then
forwarded to general contractors for use in preparing their prime bids, the awarding
authority retaining the right to final approval of the subcontractor selected. MAss.
GEx. LAws ch. 149, §§ 44A-44I (1955), as amended, MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 149,
§§44A-44I (Supp. 1963).
17 Secret competitive bidding is widely used in negotiating prime contracts on
public building projects. COHEN, PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND THE LAW
§ 1.1 (1961). This requirement was originally based in part on the assumption that
public officials lack the requisite technical knowledge and personal involvement which
would enable them directly to negotiate advantageous contracts on the open market.
See Fones Hardware Co. v. Erb, 54 Ark. 645, 650, 17 S.W. 7, 8 (1891); Han-
nan v. Board of Educ., 25 Okla. 372, 377, 107 Pac. 646, 648 (1909). However, since
general contractors do possess both the technical knowledge and the personal involve-
ment assumed to be lacking in public officials, there would appear to be no need to
limit the manner in which they negotiate their subcontracts.
18 These tactics, variously referred to as bid shopping or bid peddling, involve
soliciting competitive subbids and then revealing the lowest subbid as a starting point
for further open market bargaining. See Ring Constr. Corp., 8 T.C. 1070, 1075
(1947) ; Williams v. Favret, 161 F.2d 822, 824-25 (5th Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion) ;
Schueller, spra note 16, at 498 n.6. It has been urged that such activity does not
result in lowest prices either because the initial bids are made high knowing they
are bargaining prices and hence the agreed price will not be the lowest possible but
simply lower than any other, or because the competitive market at the time does not
involve all the bidders, the lowest price is not obtained. See, e.g., Hearings on
S. 1644 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Hearings]. However, it would
appear that if general contractors could get cheaper prices by using competitive
bidding exclusively, they would do so since it would enable them to increase their
profit margin. It has also been claimed that even if lower prices do result, use of
such tactics often results in lower quality work on the part of subcontractors, a dis-
advantage to the public. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'r CODE § 4101; 1955 Hearings at 174.
However, there is generally either an architect or engineer on the project who inspects
the work in progress, thereby reducing any tendency to do shoddy work or use inferior
materials. See Matera, Public Contracts-Authority of the Engineer, 47 MASs. L.Q.
379 (1962). For a further development of the arguments, see Schueller, supra note
16, at 499-501.
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procedure to secret competitive bidding.19 Hence subcontractors have, in
many instances, established bid depository systems designed to facilitate
and encourage such a procedure. ° The defendant in Christiansen, for
example, provided a facility which would collect sealed subbids from its
members, hold them until four hours prior to the time set for submission
of prime bids, and then deliver them to general contractors. 2' Following
award of the general contract, all subbids were tabulated and distributed
to members who had participated in the bidding.22
19 A competent mechanical subcontractor incurs considerable expense in esti-
mating a bid. See, e.g., Milone & Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc., 49
Wash. 2d 363, 364, 301 P.2d 759, 760 (1956) ; Hearings on S. 1644, H.R. 7637, H.R.
7638, H.R. 7668, H.R. 7676, H.R. 7686, H.R. 7693 Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1956) (estimating cost
of over $20,000 on one project) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Hearings]. Thus, the
subcontractor is understandably reluctant to have his bid revealed and used in negoti-
ation with another subcontractor who need not necessarily have made an independent
estimate but may simply be relying upon the work product of those who did as a
means of making his own proposal. For other arguments, see, e.g., Engineering
News-Record, May 23, 1963, p. 173 ("Bid Shopping Scorched by Subs") ; Engineer-
ing News-Record, Jan. 29, 1959, p. 77 ("Can Bid Shopping Be Curbed"?).
20A considerable number of bid depositories exist in the United States, either in
the form of legal entities organized ad hoc, or as adjuncts to other functions of
various trade associations. Letter From William H. Orrick, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, to the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Oct. 1, 1964, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsyl-
vania; Engineering News-Record, Feb. 14, 1963, p. 29. Basic to depository operation
is a central facility for the collection of subbids. Beyond this, two principal types
of systems are employed. In the first type, upon request, both original subbids which
are forwarded to general contractors and copies of the originals which are retained by
the depository are collected for tabulation and distribution to all bidders at some
later time. See United States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc.,
TRADE REG. RP.P. (1958 Trade Cas.) 69087 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 1958), modified,
TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) ff 69266 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1958), By setting
a deadline beyond which subbids will not be accepted and then holding the subbids
until a short time prior to prime bid opening time, the depository presumably can
limit pre-award negotiation. This, of course, requires that depository members refrain
from dealing directly with general contractors. Post-award "chiseling" is presumably
discouraged by making a public record of the subbids and any necessary negotiation
is carried on with full knowledge of what the original bids were.
The second type of system relies solely upon collecting copies of subbids for
subsequent tabulation and publication. This system does not obligate the subcon-
tractor to maintain prices he reports but gives him a basis for comparing his bids
with others and resisting pressure. Thus, a self-imposed stability may be effected.
This second type of system has been tentatively approved by the Department of Justice
through its "railroad release" procedure. See Schueller, supra note 16, at 515-16.
For a more detailed description of the procedures of a depository which reportedly
received a "railroad release," see Engineering News-Record, Dec. 25, 1958, p. 124.
21 A principal complaint of general contractors is that they frequently receive
subbids only minutes before they are required to submit their prime bids and hence
are given no opportunity to check the bids for accuracy or the bidders for reliability.
See, e.g., 1956 Hearings at 156, 165. Subcontractors attribute the lateness of the
submission of subbids to the fear that their bids will be "shopped." See 1955 Hearings
at 90. The four hour period provided by the present depository appears to represent
a reasonable compromise giving the general contractor sufficient time to evaluate his
subbids while giving the subcontractor some assurance that his bid will not be
"shopped."
22 Defendant's practice of releasing the bid tabulations only to those members
who participated in the bidding falls short of full disclosure which seems more de-
sirable. However, a countervailing pressure is that subcontractors do not submit the
same subbids to all general contractors and full disclosure might prove embarrassing.
See Engineering News-Record, Sept 27, 1962, p. 61. Interviews with members of
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These procedures reflect the generally accepted system often used for
secret prime bidding and do not seem unreasonably restrictive in them-
selves. General contractors could unilaterally require a similar process, and
the depository can thus be viewed simply as a means of providing this
service for them. Difficulties arise, however, when subcontractors seek
to do more than just make such a facility available. Although it may be
only natural to do so, any attempts (1) to induce general contractors to
use the facility, or (2) to encourage general contractors to use the subbids
of depository members in preference to those of nonmembers, or (3) to
enforce compliance with depository rules may lead to unreasonable re-
straints upon trade and, in some instances, to boycott.
Subcontractors may attempt to induce use of the system by agreeing
to withhold subbids from nonparticipating general contractors. Such an
agreement, whether embodied in depository rules or arrived at by mutual
understanding, is prima facie evidence of a purpose to boycott and is illegal
despite the lack of any evidence that it actually resulted in restraint of
trade.2 3 In Christiansen the court found that "the rules tend to compel
general contractors to affiliate with the Depository because of economic
pressure in obtaining representative bids" and "encourage mechanical sub-
contractors bidding through the Bid Depository to boycott general con-
tractors who do not sign the Depository agreement." 24 However, the
rules did not forbid members to bid outside the system and there was no
prima facie evidence of any purpose, express or implied, to withhold
bids from general contractors who did not use the system.2 5 This suggests
the construction industry in Philadelphia during August, 1964 revealed that subcon-
tractors often submit lower bids to general contractors with a good reputation for
prompt payment and efficient work scheduling. Individual working relationships may
also be a contributing factor. It might be preferable, therefore, to publish only the
amount of individual bids, omitting the name of the bidder.
23 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12 (1945). In United
States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Contractors, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1958
Trade Cas.) 1169087 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 1958), modified, TRADE REG. REP. (1959
Trade Cas.) 69266 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1958), a depository operation almost identical
to that of the defendant in Christiansen was generally approved. The court specifically
found no evidence of coercion to use the depository. Id., 69087, at 74305.
Schueller, .mpra note 16, at 528-30, lists twenty-eight cases in which bid deposi-
tory operations have been challenged by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment since 1939 and notes that "with the possible exception of two situations, all bid
depository cases listed . . . showed elements of coercion or boycott . . . ." Id. at
507. See generally id. at 506-12. Schueller also notes that: "[Viery few of the bid
depositories attacked by the Antitrust Division for coercion or boycott relied on the
strength of their members alone. In most cases, participation by labor groups, sup-
pliers, or customers was alleged." Id. at 510. Thus, for example, a depository asso-
ciation could enter into an agreement in which a union would agree not to furnish
labor to general contractors who failed to use the depository. There is no suggestion
that such arrangements were present in the Christiansen case.
24 230 F. Supp. at 190.
25 Portions of depository rule V, quite to the contrary, provided that:
It is also to be understood that any general contractor who has not made a
request for bids from the Depository may solicit mechanical bids from any
person or firm that he desires, and that he is not obligated to use the De-
pository at all if he does not wish to do so. The Depository service will be
available upon request from any general contractor on one or more of his
1965]
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that the court may have regarded a depository operation per se as tending
naturally to result in boycott, and thus its mere existence would be
sufficient evidence to show a combination in restraint of trade. It may be
that individual subcontractors identify a general contractor's failure to use
the depository system with a predilection to utilize "unfair" methods of
negotiating subcontracts and, to that extent, the depository could be a
covert means of creating a blacklist. However, to conclude that a depository
will naturally compel or encourage subcontractors to boycott general con-
tractors who fail to use it does not appear reasonable, and, in the absence
of direct evidence that a boycott actually resulted, depository operations
should not be condemned on that ground.2 6
The plaintiff in Christiansen argued, however, that depository rule
V 2 7 resulted in a boycott of nonmember subcontractors because a general
contractor who wished to receive depository bids was required to agree
in effect that he would not use bids from subcontractors who were not
members of the association. 8 The rule, it may be urged, is more rea-
jobs, without the general contractor thereby being committed or required in
any way to use the service on other jobs.
230 F. Supp. at 193 n.21. These provisions appear to be in harmony with recom-
mendations for effective depository operation found in Schueller, supra note 16, at
526-27.26 If, in fact, a number of individual contractors were withholding subbids, the
mere existence of the depository association would probably be sufficient additional
evidence to show a combination or conspiracy to boycott See Withrow, Trade Asso-
ciations, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 173, 177 (1959). This would obviate the difficulties
sometimes faced by courts in "conscious parallelism" cases where nothing more than
the business effect is shown and direct evidence of conspiracy or agreement is lacking.
See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) ;
Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962) ; Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HA~v. L. REv. 655
(1962).
In Christiansen one general contractor did testify that "in order to be sure of
getting representative bids it was necessary to join [use?] the Depository." 230 F.
Supp. at 191 n.13. In addition, one subcontractor testified that his company would
not do business with any general contractor who was not bound by the rules. Post-
Trial Brief for Plaintiff, p. 20. However, this hardly seems sufficient to show con-
certed refusal to deal, see Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 150 F.2d 877, 885
(7th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (evidence that product previously avail-
able to plaintiff was unobtainable after alleged conspiracy); Johnson v. J. H. Yost
Lumber Co., 117 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1941) (evidence of threats to cut off source of
supply followed by inability to secure supplies), and the court was apparently unable
to find other evidence of concerted boycotting. See 230 F. Supp. at 191 n.14.
27 See note 3 supra.
28 Post-Trial Brief for Plaintiff, p. 26. Other depository rules were also attacked
as unduly restrictive. Rule III prohibited the splitting of subbids into component
elements such as plumbing only or heating only. Small contractors capable of per-
forming in only one area could thus be excluded from bidding or forced to subcontract
the work they were unable to perform to still other subcontractors-a practice which
would limit their ability to compete effectively. Furthermore, this rule could also
lead to a tying arrangement, illegal per se, by forcing general contractors to accept
all the services furnished by depository members or none. Cf. International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Depository rule VIII allowed only members who submitted bids initially to rebid
on a project for a period of ninety days. The rule contributes nothing to the stated
objectives of the depository and would result in an arbitrary bar to subcontractors
who inadvertently missed the first round of bidding or were unable to participate
for other reasons.
The court held both rules illegal. 230 F. Supp. at 189.
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sonably read as requiring nothing more than an exclusive dealing arrange-
ment as a condition precedent to use of the depository. In its specific
terms, the language of the rule does not require a refusal to deal with non-
members, but rather an agreement to make exclusive use of depository
bids. To read this language as requiring an agreement to boycott would
effectively turn most exclusive dealing arrangements into agreements to
boycott. Furthermore, the rule seems fair and reasonably necessary to
effective depository operation. Subcontractors could hardly be expected
to limit their freedom to negotiate by committing themselves to depository
procedures without requiring a similar commitment to the procedures on
the part of general contractors who wish to use them. So long as the
general contractor's initial decision to use the depository is not coerced,
rule V seems to require nothing more than a simple quid pro quo for the
association's furnishing the service. Thus it is necessary to examine the
"practical effect" of the rule.29
The Christiansen court's finding that plaintiff was "substantially ex-
cluded from the opportunity of competing" 3 0 may have been somewhat
premature since there was no showing that plaintiff had been denied
depository membership or that membership requirements were, in fact, dis-
criminatory or restrictive. 1  In Associated Press v. United States,32 the
Supreme Court considered a rule which forbade sale of Associated Press
news to newspapers which were not members of the association and held it
illegal only so long as there were discriminatory restrictions placed upon
becoming a memberPas In the Christiansen case, it can be argued that if
plaintiff was excluded, it was only because of his unilateral decision not to
participate in the depository procedures.
It is questionable whether a depository should require membership
at all since the benefit provided is essentially nothing more than the oppor-
tunity to do business in a particular manner. Membership requirements
do not seem to be a sine qua non of effective operation of a depository
and are clearly open to abuse since they can be employed at will to exclude
29 See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
30 230 F. Supp. at 194.
31 The rules stated:
Any person, firm, partnership or corporation in the plumbing, heating, venti-
lating and air-conditioning industry, operating as contractors from a recog-
nized place of business, and who meets the licensing requirements of the
State of Utah may become members of the depository.
Rules and Regulations of the Utah Mechanical Contractors Bid Depository-Quali-
fication of Members of the Depository.
.32326 U.S. 1 (1945).
83 Id. at 21-22. The Associated Press by-laws, in addition to the sales prohibi-
tion, clothed individual members with the power to impose restrictive conditions upon
admission of business competitors while permitting relatively free admittance to non-
competitors. The Court did not proscribe restrictive membership requirements per se
but held only that whatever requirements were established had to apply equally to
all applicants. However, in United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411
(1912), the Court directed that a decree be entered requiring a group of railroads
to submit a plan whereby other railroads could gain admission to ownership of a
jointly owned facility under "just and reasonable terms" and whereby nonowners
could have free use of the facility.
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potential competitors from the market.34 Nevertheless, absent a showing
that membership requirements were unduly restrictive, it is not clear how
defendant's rule V, either in purpose or effect, actually foreclosed plaintiff
from a substantial share of general contractors' business.3 5
However, even if no boycott of nonmembers resulted from the opera-
tion of rule V, the spectre of boycott may arise from still a third source-
the depository's attempt to enforce compliance with its rules and the ex-
clusive agreement. In addition to denying further depository use to
general contractors who violated their agreement, the defendant's regula-
tions included provisions for suspending members for violation of deposi-
tory rules.3 6 It is apparent that these enforcement provisions, by contem-
plating the exclusion of members from further opportunity to deal with
those general contractors who continued to use only depository bids, would
result in a boycott since the suspended subcontractor would no longer have
access to the system.
37
In addition, the defendant's practice of notifying members of the names
of general contractors who violated the exclusive agreement can be viewed
as creating a blacklist. In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States,3 the Supreme Court inferred a conspiracy to boycott from
the practice of circulating to members of a retail lumber dealers' association
a list of names of wholesalers who engaged in "unfair" trade practices.
Although it can be argued that the defendants in Christiansen were simply
trying to enforce an agreement,3 9 the identification of violators was clearly
34For example, in the Christiansen case, the requirement that the contractor be
operating out of a "recognized place of business," see note 31 supra, could be used to
exclude the small, marginal contractor who maintains no offices but works out of
his home. Similarly, it is not clear what effect the state licensing requirement would
have on contractors outside the state who might wish to bid on a Utah project,
especially since such contractors may not have occasion to use the services more than
a few times.
35 If plaintiff was not foreclosed, he should have been denied recovery even though
other aspects of the depository operation were found to be illegal, since his injury
could only be compensable if a proximate result of the operation and enforcement
of rule V. A further countervailing evidentiary factor is that, despite his alleged
foreclosure from the market while rule V was in effect, plaintiff received a higher
percentage of the total contracts awarded than he did during eleven months of de-
pository operations before adoption of the rule. 230 F. Supp. at 194.
36Rule VII provided that: "Any member, after a hearing, and who has been
found by a majority of the committee to have failed to comply with the rules and
regulations of the depository . . . . may be suspended from the depository, and
further membership denied." 230 F. Supp. at 189.
Courts have been unsympathetic to such policing provisions, viewing them as
attempts to set up "extra-judicial tribunals" which impinge upon the power of the
legislature. See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457,
465 (1940) ; Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1957) ; With-
row, sipra note 26, at 182.
37 In United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental Sys., Inc., TRADE RFG. RE'.
(1955 Trade Cas.) 1168101, at 70574 (D. Kan. July 2, 1955), aff'd men., 355 U.S. 10
(1957), the court found that a trade association by-law providing for expulsion of a
member if necessary "to keep this System out of legal entanglements or to preserve
the good name and business of the System," constituted an agreement to boycott in
violation of the Sherman Act.
38234 U.S. 600 (1914).
39 Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 216 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
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unnecessary to enforcement of depository rules since the association already
had the power to deny further depository use for noncompliance. Thus
the notification of members could serve no purpose other than to induce
their refusal to deal with such general contractors outside the depository
system.40
In view of the foregoing discussion, the question becomes what, if
anything, can an association of subcontractors do to encourage the use and
effective operation of a depository system. While an answer applicable
to all situations is impossible, it would seem reasonable to assume that
simple persuasion should be permissible.41 Yet the position of an individual
depository may be such that even persuasion may tend to restrain un-
reasonably. The very nature of a bid depository association, its concerted
and consensual character, its economic significance vis-A-vis the individual
contractor, and its stated purpose of providing the best means for con-
tractors to carry on a vital portion of their business, places it in a position
of considerable economic power. It has been noted that:
[Restraint of trade] may exist although it is not manifested in
any overt act, and even though there is no intent to restrain.
Words of advice seemingly innocent and perhaps benevolent, may
restrain, when uttered under circumstances that make advice
equivalent to command. For the essence of restraint is power;
and power may arise merely out of position.
42
Any pressure, even though considerably short of boycott, may result in
restraint of trade because of an individual contractor's natural and rea-
sonable reluctance to fly in the face of such power. Even though the
depository contemplates no boycott, a general contractor, faced with a
"suggestion" that he would get more subbids if he used the depository,
may be forced to consider carefully what will happen if he refuses and might
reasonably decide that use of the depository is preferable to the possibility
that he may find it difficult to get subbids otherwise.43
40 Cf. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600, 612 (1914).
41 In Paint Dealers Institute of New York City, FTC Dkt. 6367, TRADE REG. REP.
1126890 (1957), a complaint that a trade association conspired to force manufacturers
of paint to sell only to recognized independent dealers was dismissed for lack of evi-
dence. The examiner said:
It appears that the respondents in this proceeding limited their activities to
explaining the services of the independent dealer and the advantage of selecting
him as a prime outlet for the products of manufacturers . . . . This does
not constitute a per se violation of law, and illegality cannot be inferred from
this conduct alone.
4 2 American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 414 (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). The court in United States v. Bakersfield Associated
Plumbing Contractors, Inc., TRADE: REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) 1 69266, at 75037-38
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1958), perhaps in recognition of the danger inherent in such
power, retained jurisdiction and provided for continuing inspection of the depository
operation by the Department of Justice.
43It does not seem unreasonable to assume that it was this consideration that
prompted the testimony of one general contractor in the Christauen case that he
1965]
240 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Voi.114:231
Whether or not this power can be completely negated is open to
question. However, certain steps may be suggested. First, the adminis-
tration of the depository should be entrusted to a disinterested third party
such as a bank or legal office." This would serve to insulate users of the
service from arguably coercive contacts with members of the association
sponsoring the depository. In any event, association members must be
impressed with their duty to refrain from any acts or statements which
could be interpreted as an attempt to exert pressure to use the system.
Second, use of the service should be open to all. Even though association
membership requirements may be so liberal as to amount to a mere
formality, the formality is clearly not necessary, and completely free access
to the depository seems more compatible with the spirit of the enterprise.
Third, any tendency to abuse the system is probably best prevented by
continually exposing the process to public observation.4 5 Thus provision
should be made for full disclosure of all depository operations, including
the publication of bid data following submission of the bids. Such bid
data need not necessarily include the names of bidders but should be open
to all interested parties.4 0 Beyond these controls, enforcement provisions
of any kind cannot be tolerated. The depository must rely solely upon
the benefits supposed to be inherent in the system to induce use of its
procedures and to ensure compliance.
felt it necessary to request bids from the depository. 230 F. Supp. at 191 n.13.
Thus it is possible under the specific circumstances of this case, that it was reasonable
for general contractors to feel restricted by the mere existence of the depository and
that the restraint, although not a boycott, was unreasonable under a rule of reason
approach. Such a finding, however, would not necessarily entitle plaintiff to recover
in a private suit for, while it has been held that public injury need not be shown
where a per se violation exists, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) ; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959),
there has been no similar holding in cases decided under the rule of reason. More-
over, one commentator has expressed the opinion that a public injury requirement
survives outside the per se area. Handler, supra note 9, at 865-66.
44 This device is used by the depository reportedly given a "railroad release"
by the Department of Justice. Engineering News-Record, Dec. 25, 1958, p. 124. One
source has suggested that privately owned, profit motivated depositories might prove
more effective than those operated by industry groups. Engineering News-Record,
Feb. 14, 1963, p. 29.
45 A collateral benefit of such disclosure would be to bring the depository to the
attention of builders, architects and awarding authorities who might then request
general contractors to make use of the service. Architects, in particular, have ex-
pressed concern over the practices of bid peddling and bid shopping, see AMmIcAN
INSTiTUTE OF ARCHiTEcTS, HANDBOOK OF ARcHITECTURAL PRACTICE § 111-7.02 (8th
ed. 1958), and might be expected to insist upon use of the depository.
46 See note 22 supra. In United States v. Bakersfield Associated Plumbing Con-
tractors, Inc., TRADE REG. R n'. (1959 Trade Cas.) ir 69266, at 75037 (S.D. Cal. Dec.
22, 1958), the court entered a decree ordering the.depository to "announce and pub-
lish" all bids at a specified time after giving notice of such bid openings to all inter-
ested parties.
